The Real Reason Average Russians Choose to Believe Tyrants Like Putin

Many people in the West still ask the wrong question about Putin’s Russia.

Why do Russians believe the same old story about enemies, traitors, NATO, sacred Russia, and the West trying to destroy them?

But belief is not always what it looks like.

In Russia, people often “believe” the ruler for a much more practical reason: because the ruler sits at the center of the system that decides who gets protection, money, status, safety, and permission to succeed.

And once you understand that, Putin’s dictatorship stops looking like a mystery.

It starts looking like an ancient survival structure scaled up to a country of 140 million people.

At the top, there is the dominant figure. Around him, clans compete for access. Below them, loyal servants get pieces of the national wealth. Farther down, millions of ordinary people learn the oldest rule in the hierarchy: do not challenge the one who controls your food, your job, your documents, your future, and your fear.

This is not patriotism in the normal sense.

It is dependence dressed up as patriotism.

And it explains a great deal: why incompetent people rise, why honest people leave or shut up, why corruption becomes normal, why public loyalty does not always mean private belief, and why so many Russians can understand everything — and still choose the safer lie.

Today, I want to show you the real reason average Russians choose to believe tyrants like Putin — not because they are uniquely brainwashed, but because the system has trained them to treat belief as a survival strategy.

Here’s our roadmap:

  • The Caste System — how the regime uses strict social layers to protect itself
  • The Mycelium — why the elite functions like a parasitic network that keeps outsiders away
  • Negative Selection — how the system purges competence and rewards people willing to do the dirty work
  • The Cynic’s Survival — how people who “understand everything” still find ways to live inside the machine
  • The Price to Pay — what this system costs Russia in capital, talent, trust, and human potential

The Caste System

An authoritarian system survives because it successfully divides a society into rigid castes.

This isn’t just about inequality; it is about engineering a state of “artificial childhood” for the majority. By denying citizens independent resources and forcing them into total state dependence, the regime strips them of their autonomy, effectively rendering them helpless. When you have no safety net of your own, your entire survival depends on the power above you, which is exactly where the regime wants you.

But look at what happens as you move up that hierarchy. In a society defined by chains, “freedom” becomes the ultimate currency—specifically, the freedom from the law itself. The higher you ascend, the more immunity you gain from the very constraints that bind everyone else.

And this is the most critical point: you do not climb this ladder through merit or hard work. It is a closed loop. Entry into the ruling class requires you to be “taken in”—usually through strategic marriages, deep-rooted student ties, or years of demonstrated, unwavering service to a specific clan. Your status is only cemented once the system grants you a piece of the state’s resources, tying your personal survival to the survival of the regime itself.

The core of this elite remains remarkably static, formed from the descendants of Soviet-era party and security apparatchiks, bolstered by select, compliant figures from the arts and academia. Status here isn’t just about what you own; it’s about who acknowledges and accepts your presence in the inner circle. While those at the bottom struggle to survive, hoping at best to afford a small apartment, those at the top live in a tier of luxury that rivals—and sometimes exceeds—that of global potentates. Yet, this power is inherently precarious; your immunity is not guaranteed by law, but by your continued utility to the regime and the whims of the political wind. Because the system is objectively inefficient, it relies on this caste structure to survive; those who possess these hard-won privileges will inevitably fight to the death to keep the current order intact.

The Mycelium

To understand how this elite actually functions, forget the idea of a formal organization or a “machine” metaphor. It is more accurate to view it as a mycelium—a vast, subterranean network of threads that feed and support the entire system while holding the perimeter to ensure no outsider ever gains a foothold.

Every thread in this network is there to serve the collective, but the primary function of the mycelium is defense. It doesn’t just grow; it guards its territory. If you want to enter this elite from the outside, you cannot simply bring talent or fresh ideas. You have to be “stained” first.

I remember a conversation with a friend who, in her youth, was offered a position in the marketing department of a major state monopoly, the Russian Railways. On paper, it sounded like a career-making opportunity. In reality, it was a test of compliance. She was offered a modest salary and a massive million-ruble budget. The instruction was simple: steal the money in such a way that the books look perfect, and then share the spoils with the person who granted you the position and the one who approved the budget.

This is the ritual of the mycelium. By forcing you to participate in a crime, the system ensures that you are now a part of the “we.” You have no clean hands left to turn against the mycelium. You are trapped by your own complicity. The public will never trust you because you are a thief, and the West will never accept you because you either. There is nowhere left to run, and that is precisely how the system guarantees loyalty.

Within this network, you can switch positions, and you can change roles, but the one thing you absolutely cannot do is try to jump from one clan to another. That is the only real threat to the regime’s stability, and for that, the mycelium does not offer a promotion—it offers a death sentence.

Negative Selection

In a functioning society, the goal of any organization is to attract the best and the brightest. But in an authoritarian system, talent is not an asset—it is a liability. If you are smart, ambitious, and capable of independent thought, you are a threat to the “mycelium.” This is why such regimes are defined by a brutal, consistent process of negative selection.

If you are a talented person living under this system, your path is painfully narrow. You have only three real options: emigrate; crawl into a clan—which requires, as we discussed, staining your soul and selling your conscience; or stay outside the system but work as a service provider for the wealthy, hoping to snatch a few crumbs for yourself. For the vast majority who remain, the choice is stripped of all nuance: do you want to be poor and powerless, or are you willing to look the other way while the system inflicts violence and corruption, all in exchange for status and money?

The system considers corruption and petty scam at every level so natural that you will find people who genuinely believe they are “great patriots,” yet simultaneously spend their entire lives dodging taxes, funneling bribes, and cutting every corner imaginable. I had a conversation recently with a veterinarian from Kaliningrad that perfectly illustrates this cognitive dissonance. She told me, with absolute sincerity, how much she loved Russia and how “correct” she believed Putin’s actions were. In the very next breath, she bragged about how she hides her cash income from tax authorities and cheats on medication invoices for her clients. She wasn’t ashamed—she didn’t have to be. She knows the state sees it, too. But the state doesn’t care about her honesty; it cares about her submission. As long as the “patriotic” veterinarian keeps a portion of that stolen money flowing upward, the system closes its eyes.

This culture of the “useful crook” is a direct inheritance from the Soviet obsession with the “simple man,” whom they pitted against the “rotten intelligentsia.” The state officially viewed the intellectual—the person who reflects and questions—as an inherent threat. During the “Leninist and Stalinist purges,” the regime didn’t just remove people; they actively replaced the intelligent and literate with those who lacked both education and the capacity for reflection. They prioritized people who didn’t know how to think, because people who don’t think don’t ask why the fire is burning.

Even in the late 1980s, the state tried to prop up “simple workers” while keeping the intelligentsia down. We ended up in a strange reality where factory workers often made twice as much as someone with a higher education, yet the prestige still clung to those who studied. 

If we stand in the shoes of a village boy, born to illiterate parents, struggling to even write his own name on a payroll sheet, we understand that the offer to perform “dirty work” for the state is his only chance to jump out of the soul-crushing Soviet poverty and helplessness. He takes that chance. A normal career is impossible for him because he lacks the intellect and education. But his willingness to abandon his conscience becomes his greatest competitive advantage—a tool he uses to easily outmaneuver his more principled rivals.

These low- and mid-level managers created a specific culture where shouting at subordinates was the norm, where stealing and inflating numbers were standard practice, and where the prevailing morals were those of the prison camp. And this is another crucial layer: millions of people passed through Stalin’s camps and the prison system, emerging with the conviction that the criminal underworld was the only real force capable of resisting or defeating the state. This is why “criminal romance”—the glorification of thug life—is so popular in Russia.

When you layer this history over decades, it becomes clear why it was a natural progression for Putin to call on these marginal figures to fight his war. For those who wanted to do the “dirty work” for money and status—things they could never achieve otherwise—the war was a ladder. And for “losers” of all kinds, the war is a chance to move to a different level. They will defend this system and its brutal methods to the end, because only within this system do they keep their status, their property, and their role as the enforcers of the state.

The Cynic’s Survival

When you look from the outside, it is easy to succumb to the myth that “the Russian population supports the war because they share the regime’s values.” You see the absence of million-person protests and conclude that the people must be in lockstep with the Kremlin. Such reasoning shows a total ignorance of how Russian society is actually wired. To get millions onto the streets, you need a political campaign—you need to agitate, to call, to persuade. This was never safe, but today, you will be arrested within roughly an hour and likely handed a five-year prison term. And the people arresting you? They are the very cogs we discussed earlier—the ones who feel no shame in doing the system’s “dirty work”.

I recently spoke with a psychologist from St. Petersburg, asking her how the country is breathing. She told me that everyone she knows is in a state of deep depression. Her slice of society is the intelligentsia: you cannot speak, you cannot plan for a future because you know something bad is coming, and you cannot rely on your career surviving. As the state ramps up daily repression, she sees four distinct strategies people use to preserve their sanity:

  • Internal Emigration: Many stop reading the news entirely. She seea this in many of her acquaintances—they lose themselves in gardening, fantasy literature, and superficial conversations to avoid the pain of reality. Outsiders judge them for this, but my friend sees it differently: those who are safe have no right to condemn them. 

And honestly, when you view the world through their eyes, this strategy of waiting and preserving your mental health is entirely rational.

  • Defensive Cynicism: This is the strategy of telling yourself that the world is inherently unjust, that “everywhere is like this,” and that there is no truth. These people adopt the beliefs that are most profitable for them in the here and now, carefully following their superiors’ lead while pushing away any deeper reflection. This is how a recent prank became so telling: a prankster posing as the Department of Education ordered provincial school principals to craft and photograph themselves in “foil helmets.” Many complied. When the command comes from above, the brain shuts off—not because they want to look like fools, but because they fear the wrath of the system. In this environment, cynicism and hidden defiance prevail: they nod, they comply, but they look out for their own interests.
  • Stockholm Syndrome: Some people merge with the aggressor, identifying with the state to protect themselves, hoping the system will see them as “one of their own” and spare them from punishment. You see this in the massive amount of performative outrage online; there is no logic here, and moral arguments cannot pierce through this kind of psychological resistance.
  • The Opportunist’s Wave: There are those who see a wave coming and decide to jump on it. At the start of the war, some truly believed Russia was “restoring justice” and bringing happiness to the world, viewing Russia as an absolute, inevitable force. They joined the side they thought would win. Many weren’t simple opportunists; their personal fears and desires happened to align with the state’s narratives. These became the “flaming patriots,” completely blind to the fact that their own actions were leading to the destruction of their own country.

These strategies don’t turn people into loyalists; they turn them into citizens of “the silence.” They nod when required, they offer the expected slogans, but deep down, they are just waiting to survive the day. The state counts this as support, but it is nothing of the sort—it is merely the emptiness created when people are forced to stop imagining a future that belongs to them.

The Price to Pay

A system that runs on non-motivated people who don’t believe in their work, on thieves who snatch everything not nailed down, and on incompetent managers who have no clue about the long-term consequences of their actions is, by definition, a system designed to fail.

In this environment, personal gain is fundamentally disconnected from any collective or national interest. To put a single ruble into your own pocket, you often have to inflict several rubles’ worth of damage on the state or the project you are supposedly managing. People involved in state procurement for sanctioned goods have told me that prices are routinely inflated by three times—and no one finds this strange. That inflated cost isn’t just the price of the goods; it covers the bribes, the kickbacks, and the silent consent of the people who created and funded that state order in the first place.

All of this adds up to one unavoidable reality: Russia is losing its competitive edge on the global market. For years, this inefficiency was masked by the massive influx of oil and gas revenues, which acted as a cushion, covering the losses created by the system. But the war has severed the most important market for these resources: Western Europe. And attempts to simply “pivot” to other partners haven’t filled the void.

Meanwhile, the costs of the war continue to climb. We have reached a point where the massive staffing problems caused by this “negative selection” process can no longer be masked by throwing money at the issue.

Ultimately, the decline of Russia as a geopolitical player is not just a matter of external pressure—it is an internal, structural certainty. Politics and economics are, at their core, made by people, and it is those people who are making the final decisions. When the quality of decision-making is this low, and when the system is incentivized to reward corruption over competence, no declared objective will ever be achieved.



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Recent Comments

  • Bruce Farquhar
    06/17/2026 - 11:19 · Reply

    This is such an illustrative article. I love reading these in-depth analyses.

  • Claude METZGER
    06/18/2026 - 14:25 · Reply

    Chère Elvira,
    Pour moi qui ne suis plus retourné, depuis le début de la guerre en Russie où j’ai laissé une partie de ma famille, mes amis, vous êtes un phare dans la nuit. J’ai toujours ressenti le malaise d’une parole retenue, des pirouettes humoristiques pour ne jamais toucher le fond des problèmes, cette infantilisation, cette paupérisation des meilleurs. Votre terme de mycélium est parfaitement choisi. Vous avez le génie d’exprimer par des mots précis une sensation diffuse. J’ai assisté à des scènes surréalistes de partage de commissions pour des missions spéciales dans un commissariat. ( J’avais un ami policier ) Les agents riaient de ma présence en faisant passer les liasses tout en plaisantant que j’allais raconter partout que la Russie était corrompue. J’ai eu l’honneur d’un périple en voiture avec un gouverneur ( décédé depuis ) qui me confiait en riant qu’il avait fait dépenser beaucoup d’argent pour une route qui menais à sa somptueuse Datcha. Et comme je lui faisait remarquer que je ne voyais qu’un chemin de terre, il répliqua qu’il avait choisi un mercedes tout terrains avec d’excellents amortisseur. Il me montra enfin sa villa ( un château) en plaisantant : “la route”…
    Votre texte est fondamental, mais je me demande qui peut le comprendre sans l’avoir vécu…

  • Kleber Andrade
    06/23/2026 - 09:08 · Reply

    Sou do Brasil. Estava ” comparando” a corrupção russa com a brasileira. Cheguei a uma conclusão: a russa é mais organizada. Triste isso não?

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