To a casual reader of headlines, America and Russia look like destined enemies—eternal, inevitable. But that’s a lie of convenience. Their history is not a straight line; it’s a spiral—admiration, rivalry, brief embraces, and long, icy silences.
Tonight I want to show you the relationship underneath the slogans—the moments when they needed each other, the years they tried to become each other, and the insults neither side has forgiven.
Think of them as two powerful roommates who can’t move out.
The United States craves achievement—moon landings, markets, medals—terrified only of failing in front of the crowd.
Russia craves recognition—yearning to be seen, to be feared, to be admitted to the table as an equal. When applause doesn’t come, Russia slams the door. When Russia slams the door, America rolls its eyes—and builds something bigger.
Frame it this way, and the chaos starts making sense.
Here’s our roadmap:
- Countries as Personalities — what each side really wants.
- Inspirers and Competitors — Alaska, wheat, and migrations.
- Unexpected Allies, Bitter Rivals — WWI relief, WWII alliance, the Cold War grind.
- The Love Affair That Went Wrong — Magnitsky Case, influence ops, Ukraine, and the status game.
Countries As Personalities
International relations shouldn’t be taught as a dry sequence of treaties, trade deals, and battlefield notes. That’s just surface noise. To understand why nations act the way they do, you have to look deeper: What do they truly want? What drives them? Where do they pour their time, money, and energy?
With Russia, the answer is painfully clear. At the core of its foreign policy lies a craving—not for land, not even for wealth, but for recognition. Russia has always chased the approval of the “cool kids,” desperate to be seen as special, magical—or at least dangerous. The worst nightmare for Russia isn’t defeat. It’s being ignored.
This obsession goes back centuries. Medieval Russia was the insecure younger sister of Byzantium, forever measuring herself against a glamorous older sibling. Later, when Europe leapt ahead with the Renaissance and then grew rich from geographic discoveries, Russia burned with envy. The gap widened further because the Russian throne itself was occupied by rulers of foreign blood—German by descent, French in language, European in their ambitions. They had far more in common with cousins in Paris, London, or Berlin than with their own subjects. And so they longed to impress those cousins.
But Russia was poor. Its elites compensated the only way they could—by flaunting what they did have: sheer size, endless manpower, and the promise of unstoppable force.
The United States, by contrast, is driven by something else entirely. Its deepest instinct is not to be loved, but to achieve—and to outdo everyone else while doing it. America is obsessed with performance, terrified not of being ignored, but of failing in front of the crowd. To stumble, to look incompetent, to be overtaken—that is the American nightmare.
If America had an honest motto, it wouldn’t be some fancy words in Latin. It would be: ‘Hold my beer.’
Scale matters here too, but not as compensation—rather as proof of greatness. For Americans, the quiet happiness of a small life in a quiet corner is not enough. Everything must be epic. You landed the first man in space? Then we’ll land one on the Moon. Did you invent a new technology? Then we’ll build the internet, put satellites in orbit, and create a digital world. Homes are bigger, awards lists longer, even electricity bills are proudly outrageous. It’s the cowboy myth turned national personality: swagger into town, defeat the villains, save the lady, tip your hat to the crowd—and ride off into the sunset.
I prefer to think of countries the way I think of people: each with their own personality type. And for that, I use my own system, something I call the Sphinx Method.
Russia, in this classification, is the Giver–Lover. You may say, “What??? A Giver? A Lover?” Yes. Above all, this personality type longs for admiration, affection, and recognition, and to earn it, they’ll strip down to their last shirt, shower others with gifts—or bribes. But all this devotion isn’t for everyone. It’s directed at a chosen object of adoration. The rest of the world can be ignored—or trampled—if love is not returned.
At their best, Giver–Lovers are kind, generous, hardworking, and peaceful. But when rejected, they flip into their opposite: vengeful, blind to their own faults, cruel toward those they envy or perceive as weaker. In normal times, the Giver–Lover is Cinderella. But once spurned, it mutates into something darker—an obsessive fan, like the one from Misery, Stephen King’s chilling novel later made into a film. She adored her favorite author and was ready to give him everything she had. But when he tried to abandon her, she broke his legs.
Remember her when you think of the war in Ukraine.
The United States, on the other hand, belongs to the Explorer–Champion crowd. This type lives with the conviction of a mission: to realize their talent and prove themselves to an imagined audience that never stops watching. Everything must be bold, daring, and spectacular. The Explorer–Champion doesn’t care much about what neighbors think—he’s too busy performing on a global stage, measuring himself against history itself.
And so, the essence of Russian–American relations becomes clear: Russia endlessly craves the love and respect of the Champion, while the Champion notices Russia only when she appears as a damsel in distress—another trophy to collect, another chance to play the savior. And when Russia realizes that love isn’t coming, she longs to hit him over the head with a shovel.
The problem? She can’t quite reach. And she doesn’t have the shovel.
If you want to dive deeper into this personality model, you can find more about my Sphinx Method here.
Inspirers and Competitors
Russia’s presence in America began in a place few Americans ever think about: Unalaska, one of the remote Aleutian Islands. In the 18th century, Russian explorers, driven by dreams of fur wealth, pushed east across Siberia and the Bering Strait. The Russian crown saw the opportunity: this expansion was cheap to sponsor, because private merchant companies—hungry for profit—took on the risk. What Russia gained was prestige. A poor, landlocked empire suddenly had a foothold in the New World. It wasn’t just about sable pelts or sea otters. It was about proving to Europe that Russia, too, could plant its flag where others planted theirs.
But Alaska never became a jewel of empire. It was a distant, frozen outpost, hard to defend and expensive to supply. By the mid-19th century, Russia was broke. The Crimean War had drained the treasury, and the empire was falling behind technologically. Selling Alaska seemed practical: unload an unprofitable territory before Britain—Russia’s great rival—snatched it by force.
So in 1867, Russia sold Alaska to the United States for $7.2 million. For Russia, it was a relief. For America, it was a gamble. The Civil War had just ended, the economy was battered, and critics mocked the deal as “Seward’s Folly,” after Secretary of State William Seward who pushed it through. But America’s instincts were sharper than its skeptics. Land meant future wealth, and Alaska’s vast resources would one day prove the point.
And symbolically, the purchase mattered even more. The U.S., barely healed from its own civil conflict, was already looking outward. Buying Alaska was a statement: America wasn’t just patching wounds—it was expanding, projecting, preparing to compete with the great powers of the world.
There was even a moment in the 1860s when it almost looked like friendship. In the thick of the U.S. Civil War, two Russian naval squadrons appeared—one in New York, the other in San Francisco. The visit was brief, but it made headlines. For a season, the mood warmed: the Russians are with us. To the Union, it felt like a nod of support and a warning to any European power tempted to back the Confederacy. Then the ships sailed away, and the warmth faded back into the usual chill.
Trade soon pulled the story in a harsher direction. In the 1850s, Russian grain exports were already struggling. Crimian War and poor policy choked supply. Then came America. After the Civil War, cheap American wheat surged across the Atlantic. Railroads, steamships, and telegraphs rewired the global market, and by the 1870s, U.S. grain undercut Russian wheat in Europe. To Washington, it was business. To St. Petersburg, it was humiliation: another race Russia wanted to win, lost to a country that hadn’t even existed a century before.
But culture travels faster than cargo. In Russian towns, schoolchildren devoured James Fenimore Cooper’s frontier novels. They thrilled to the adventures of American settlers pushing westward, and in those stories, many quietly chose sides—cheering for the colonists. For them, America became a canvas for dreams of freedom, adventure, and proving oneself.
Some didn’t just dream—they left. From the 1880s onward, waves of Jewish families fled pogroms and restrictions in the Russian Empire and poured into New York. They carried skills—sewing, trading, finance—and transformed whole industries. By 1910, Jewish workers dominated the garment trades of Manhattan. Other dissenters crossed too: Molokans, a Spiritual Christian sect from southern Russia, built communities in Los Angeles. America absorbed them, and they, in turn, left fingerprints on American life.
And then came the faces—faces that shaped America’s culture itself. Louis B. Mayer, born in the Russian Empire, crossed the ocean, worked his way theater by theater, and eventually built MGM—the studio that defined Hollywood’s star system. Gregor Piatigorsky, the cellist who fled revolution, gave Los Angeles its own musical tradition, a festival in his name still echoing today. And Sergei Rachmaninoff, one of the world’s greatest composers, ended his life in Beverly Hills. His home, his concerts, even his funeral became part of California’s cultural map.
Unexpected Allies and Bitter Rivalries
World War I offered the first taste of cooperation. Washington shipped supplies to the Russian Empire. But when the Bolsheviks seized power, America sent troops—not to fight a war, but to protect those stockpiles and the railway. About five thousand U.S. soldiers ended up near Arkhangelsk in the north, and almost eight thousand in Siberia. In American memory, the episode was quickly reduced to a historical footnote. In Russian memory, it became something else entirely—a founding legend of “foreign intervention.”
Then came a moment of unexpected kindness. In 1921, famine along the Volga River reached medieval levels of horror. Millions starved. And into that misery came Herbert Hoover’s American Relief Administration. They set up kitchens and clinics, hauled food across impossible roads, and delivered medicine to half-frozen hospitals.
At the same time, the United States recoiled from Bolshevik ideas at home. In 1919, Senate hearings stoked fear of a “Red menace.” Immigrants and leftists were rounded up in the Palmer Raids. Refugees escaping Russia fed this fear with terrifying stories: political terror, forced conformity, neighbors spying on neighbors. If you want a glimpse into that atmosphere, you’ll find it alive in my Russian Treasures novels. If you’ve already read them, please leave a review on Amazon. It really helps the algorithm to show this book to the right readers.
The fear of Bolshevism hardened into part of America’s identity. After World War I, the U.S. cast itself as the fortress of capitalism. The Soviet Union became its natural villain. Moscow, meanwhile, played a double game: worshiping the industrial machine, copying Ford’s methods, hiring American engineers—while denouncing “capitalists” as bloodsuckers. The Comintern spread its net abroad, funding the American Communist Party and trying to steer unions and student circles. Some writers and intellectuals in the U.S. admired the Soviet experiment. Moscow flattered them, courted them, invited them to see “the future.” Later, critics called them “fellow travelers” or, more brutally, “useful idiots.”
The Great Depression gave Moscow new fuel. “See? Capitalism has failed,” Soviet propaganda crowed. Yet at the same time, the Kremlin desperately wanted American expertise to industrialize. Albert Kahn’s Detroit firm designed hundreds of Soviet factories. U.S. companies helped build colossal projects like the Dnipro Dam. General Electric turbines powered it; an American engineer supervised construction and was honored by the Soviets. I cover this chapter in detail in another video.
Then came World War II, the most unlikely alliance of all. Lend-Lease shipments sent trucks, food, fuel, planes, and tanks eastward—over $11 billion worth in 1940s money. Together, the Allies crushed Hitler. And then, almost instantly, the alliance cracked. Suspicion surged.
Espionage stories made headlines. Klaus Fuchs, a German-born physicist working on the Manhattan Project, leaked bomb secrets to Moscow. In New York, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were executed for conspiracy to commit espionage. These cases supercharged America’s second Red Scare. Senator McCarthy turned paranoia into televised theater, ruining careers in the process. The line between real counterintelligence work and mass hysteria blurred, but the effect was the same: fear seeped deep into American society.
From there, the chill hardened into the Cold War. The enemies circled the ring, never striking directly, but testing each other everywhere else. In Korea, Soviet pilots flew MiGs against U.N. jets. In Vietnam, Moscow shipped weapons and advisers to Hanoi, fueling a war that drained America’s strength for a decade.
Sputnik’s beep in 1957 was a humiliation Washington could not ignore. The space race exploded. America poured money into science, founded NASA, and created DARPA—to make sure no surprise would ever hit so hard again. Out of DARPA’s projects came ARPANET, the ancestor of the internet. Yet the most dangerous moment wasn’t in orbit but in Cuba. The 1962 missile crisis pushed both countries to the edge of nuclear war, only to step back and install new guardrails—a direct hotline between Moscow and Washington.
And still, under the propaganda of enmity, trade flowed. Europe plugged into Soviet energy. Oil pipelines in the 1960s, gas deals in the 1970s, and the famous “pipes-for-gas” arrangement with West Germany. When Soviet harvests failed, Moscow bought American grain by the millions of tons. One 1972 deal was so massive it was nicknamed the “grain robbery.” Washington used trade as leverage, too. The Jackson–Vanik amendment tied commerce to the right of Jews and other minorities to emigrate—and it worked. Thousands left the USSR.
The 1970s closed with Afghanistan. Soviet tanks rolled in. Washington armed the resistance. The war bled Moscow of money and confidence. Oil profits masked the damage for a while, but not forever.
When the Berlin Wall crumbled in 1989 and the Soviet Union dissolved soon after, America celebrated it as the triumph of freedom. The hope was clear: Russia, freed from communism, could become a partner—another democracy, another market economy. Washington sent aid, advisers, loans, even manuals on how to build capitalism overnight. But the view from Moscow was different. For Russians, this wasn’t liberation—it was collapse, humiliation, the loss of empire and dignity. Instead of a warm hand of friendship, they felt the cold stare of teachers lecturing a failed student. America meant well, but its tone was unbearable: not “welcome to the club,” but “here’s how you should live.”
If we remember what the Giver–Lover craves above all—recognition and respect—the reaction becomes crystal clear.
Love Affair That Went Wrong
In the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington and Moscow even managed brief flashes of military cooperation. Russian officers joined U.S.-led efforts in the Balkans and later coordinated in limited ways during the Iraq conflicts, sharing intelligence and channels of communication. In those years, Russian leaders spoke—sometimes cautiously, sometimes boldly—about the possibility of joining NATO itself. For a moment, it looked as if history’s old rivals might finally rewrite the script. But trust never took root, and hopes faded into suspicion once again.
The United States essentially lost interest in Russia once Washington decided it was no longer a threat. Trade stayed small, and tourism never took off—Americans were hesitant to grant visas, and Russians felt both forgotten and humiliated. Even humanitarian aid, which did arrive in the form of food, clothing, and medicine, carried a bitter aftertaste. Much of it was stolen, feeding the rise of fortunes that later appeared on the pages of Forbes.
And yet, in the 1990s, Russia couldn’t take its eyes off America. American movies played to packed halls, teenagers copied U.S. fashion, and self-help books about success became bestsellers. The fascination ran deeper still: hundreds of thousands—engineers, coders, scientists, mail-order brides, hustlers—tried to start new lives across the ocean. By the 2000 census, the Russian diaspora in the U.S. stood out as unusually mobile and educated. More than half of Russian-born adults already held college degrees or higher.
At the other end of the ladder, some of the rich treated America like a safety deposit box: second homes in Florida and New York, kids at top schools.
Then came the Magnitsky case shock. Sergei Magnitsky was a Russian tax lawyer who uncovered a massive fraud scheme tied to government officials. Instead of prosecuting the thieves, the authorities arrested him. After almost a year in a Moscow jail—beaten, denied medical care—he died in 2009.
In 2012, Washington responded with the Magnitsky Act—a targeted sanctions law. It wasn’t a blanket punishment of Russia; it named individuals connected to abuses and barred them from U.S. visas, banks, and real estate. For Moscow’s elite, it was a slap in the face. Their favorite escape routes—American schools for their children, condos in New York, and shopping in Miami—were suddenly at risk.
Over time, the list grew into a global tool, used not only against Russians but against abusers elsewhere. The principle was brutally simple: if you steal and torture, you don’t get Miami.
Russia’s elite was convinced it was never a fair game. Knowing little about how American elites actually lived, they projected their own world onto them: “They’re just like us—crooks who got lucky. They don’t oppress us out of principle, but simply because they never recognized us as equals and never will. And they definitely want to take our sources of income, namely, Russian natural resources.”
Why did Russian elites decide that the evil Americans were fixated on them, targeting their oil and gas rather than Canada’s or Mexico’s? Because the Giver–Lover craves attention, and so often imagines that everything happening in the world must somehow be about them.
By the mid-2010s, the Kremlin was sure America stood behind every uprising that toppled a friendly regime. The Orange Revolution in Kyiv? U.S. plot. The Arab Spring? U.S. scheme. Russian leaders talked openly about stopping “color revolutions,” as if they were viral attacks. This wasn’t just paranoia; it became policy and media language. If a neighbor chose the West, it was because Washington had their government on the strings. Georgia’s President, Saakashvili, was cited as an example of that, and later so was every Ukrainian leader who refused Moscow’s terms.
In 2016, U.S. investigators said Russia tried to shape an American vote. Reports from Special Counsel Robert Mueller and the Senate Intelligence Committee described online operations, leaks, and other influence work. People can debate the effect, but the point for our story is: Russia tried to force a close-up on the U.S. stage, backing Trump, and the U.S. public noticed. The trust between the two capitals, never warm, cooled another ten degrees.
When invading Ukraine in 2022, Moscow said many things at once—NATO, “denazification,” protecting Russian speakers. In practice, the Kremlin framed Ukraine as a Western puppet and the fight as a civilizational one. Washington led a long list of partners that armed Kyiv. Starting with summer 2022, the aid has been vast, but paced and argued over, with constant talk about “escalation risk” and nuclear red lines. Yet the public mood in America never collapsed—polls through the past two years show solid, if shifting, support for helping Ukraine. You can still see blue-and-yellow flags in many windows.
At the same time, the Kremlin pitched itself as a fortress of “traditional values.” This isn’t true in fact; I have a video explaining it’s just about appearances. Laws widened against so-called “gay propaganda.” Budgets appeared for exporting traditional values abroad. For some Western pundits, that message had appeal. Moscow learned to launder its narratives through influencers and “independent” voices. U.S. agencies and researchers tracked bot farms, fake news sites, and high-profile interviews that gave the Kremlin a friendly microphone. None of this made Russia beloved. But it did put its arguments into living rooms where a war felt far away.
As U.S. politics shifted again in 2025, Moscow’s hopes revived: maybe a more isolationist White House would “deal” Ukraine away. The reality was far messier. Trump tried to end the war and offered Putin a chance to save face. But Putin wanted something else—to prove he mattered, that he was strong and fearsome, and that he could toy with Trump just as he had with others. In the process, he pushed too far. By making Trump look like a man out of his depth, Putin triggered the one thing Trump could never tolerate: failure.
That is why the plot of pacifying an aggressor never works. It is never truly about money or territory—it is about status, pride, and holding on to power at any cost.
And so I end with Churchill’s famous line: “Americans can always be trusted to do the right thing—once all other possibilities have been exhausted.”
So what have we really uncovered tonight?
That Russia’s deepest fear is not defeat, but being ignored.
That America’s deepest fear is not hatred, but failure.
One craves recognition, the other performance—and when these instincts collide, history bends, sometimes violently.
And now I’d like to turn this back to you. Think about your own life.
Have you ever had a relationship—personal or professional—that felt like this love–hate spiral?
Where admiration mixed with rivalry, where silence could hurt more than anger?
Share your story in the comments. I read them all, and they often reveal truths no textbook can.

Joe Das
11/03/2025 - 09:43 ·Thank you for this reflection. You are creating an opportunity to explore your theses about “The American Soul”. What you wrote made me think of General George S. Patton, whose persona developed a legendary status in American history, and he very much reflects what you wrote. Here are some things that I believe round out the picture however: “The American Soul” would also have to include the quiet dignity of Lincoln, the reluctant-statesman ideal of Washington, or the inventive spirit of Edison.
Sure there is an American maverick spirit: the belief that a single, driven, and rebellious individual can impose their will on the world and win through sheer force of personality and action.